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INTRODUCTION
The Customs Courts Act of 19801 established the United States
Court of International Trade (CIT) as the nation's forum for the
resolution of disputes arising under the Customs and
international trade laws. The CIT received a much broader
jurisdictional mandate than its predecessor, the United States
Customs Court, reflecting Congress' belief that traditional
Customs litigation, which focused on tariff rates, would diminish
in importance, and that judicial review of disputes arising under
the antidumping and countervailing duty laws would constitute a
significant part of the new Court's caseload.
The House Report 2 accompanying the Customs Courts Act of
1980 noted that:
The majority of cases before the Customs Court traditionally
involve classification and valuation issues.

* B.S., Fordham University (1974); J.D., Fordham University School of Law (1977).
Partner, Neville Peterson LLP, New York, NY and Washington, D.C.
* A.B., Providence College (1966); J.D., Catholic University of America (1969); Partner,
Donohue and Donohue, Philadelphia, PA.
1 Pub. L. 96-417, 96th Cong. 2d Sess., 94 Stat. 1727 (October 10, 1980) (concerning
judiciary and judicial review of international trade matters).
2 See H. R. REP. No. 96-1235, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. at 17-18 (discussing the makeup of
the Customs Court).
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The jurisdictional statutes of the Customs Court were
drafted at a time when tariff rates were an essential factor in
international trade. Congress was most sensitive to this and
was thus primarily concerned with establishing methods for
judicial review of administrative determinations pertaining
to classification and valuation of imported merchandise.
While these statutes did not always recognize the principle
of having a decisive impact on the rate of duty ultimately
assessed, the overall statutory scheme was constructed to
facilitate
challenges to classification
and valuation
determinations.
Multilateral negotiations have led to a significant decrease
in tariff duties and consequently a diminishing
importance in classification and valuation cases in the
overall spectrum of international trade litigation. In
their place, other measures, such as antidumping and
countervailing duty statutes, have assumed a greater
importance. [emphasis added].3

Armed with expanded jurisdiction, and wielding the same legal
and equitable powers as the Federal District Courts, the CIT has
in the past two decades resolved a broad range of legal disputes
that would have been far beyond the Customs Court's reach. In
addition to hundreds of cases arising under the antidumping and
countervailing duty laws, the Court has resolved contests
involving facial challenges to the validity of regulations,4 the
licensing of Customhouse brokers 5 and other regulated entities, 6
the pre-importation review of Customs rulings 7 and the
3 See American Grape Growers Alliance for Fair Trade v. United States, 9 Ct. Int'l
Trade 568, 569 (1985) (noting that CIT cases once largely consisted of questions involving
classification and valuation).
4 See Mast Industries, Inc. v. Regan, 8 Ct. Int'l Trade 214, 215 (1984) (challenging
interim regulations); see also American Frozen Food Inst. v. United States, 18 Ct. Int'l
Trade 565, 566 (1994) (regarding challenge to Treasury decision 94-5). See generally M.G.
Maher & Co. v. United States, 2002 Ct. Int'l Trade LEXIS 104, at *3 (Ct. Int'l Trade Aug.
30, 2002) (arguing 19 C.F.R. § 24.24(e) establishing a deadline of December 31, 2001 for
filing Harbor Maintenance Tax refund claims is invalid).
5 See, e.g., Lee v. United States, 196 F. Supp. 2d 1351, 1354 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2002)
(regarding revocation of customhouse broker's license for failure to pay penalties); see also
Shiepe v. United States, 23 Ct. Int'l Trade 66, 68 (1999) (contesting revocation of custom
broker's license for failure to file corporate documents).
6 See, e.g., Pillsbury Co. v, United States, 22 Ct. Int'l Trade 769, 771 (1998) (dealing
with revocation of ESP authority and blanket waiver).
7 See Bestfoods v. United States, 260 F.3d 1320, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (seeking
administrative ruling from the United States Customs Service); see also Ross Cosmetics
Distribution Centers v. United States, 18 Ct. Int'l Trade 979, 980 (1994) (regarding
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constitutionality of Harbor Maintenance Taxes imposed on
certain exports. 8 The CIT has also decided actions brought by the
government under 28 U.S.C. § 1582 for the determination or
collection of duties, penalties and liquidated damages. 9 Before
1980, most of these challenges would have fallen within the
jurisdiction of the Federal District Courts. In large measure,
therefore, the goal of the Customs Courts Act to expand and
diversify the CIT's supervision over Customs and trade disputes
has been fulfilled.
Despite this success, however, the scope of the .CIT's
jurisdiction remains a matter of considerable dispute. The
vagaries of the CIT's jurisdictional reach have bedeviled the
Court itself, the Circuit Courts of Appeal, and even the United
States Supreme Court.10 Few courts spend as much time
debating the scope of their jurisdiction as does the CIT.
External factors have also changed the nature of the disputes
presented to the CIT. Reduced tariffs resulting from multilateral
agreements and trade preference programs have limited the
number of traditional Customs valuation, classification and
drawback issues decided by the Court. Changes in the way the
United States Customs Service administers and enforces the
customs and trade laws have also affected the way in which some
disputes are presented for judicial review.
Finally, despite Congress' intent that the CIT be the exclusive
forum for the resolution of customs and trade disputes, some
types of cases have escaped the Court's grasp, and continue to be
resolved by the Federal District Courts.
A generation has passed since the Customs Courts Act entered
into force. Despite the Act's obvious successes, it is an
Customs' remand determination). See generally Holford USA Ltd. Inc. v. United States,
19 Ct. Int'l Trade 1486 (1995) (contesting denial of reconsideration of a ruling by the
United States Customs Service).
8 See U.S. Shoe Corp. v. United States, 523 U.S. 360, 363 (1998) (deciding whether or
not the tax is permissible); see also Swisher Int'l Inc. v. United States, 205 F.3d 1358,
1359 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (discussing the harbor Maintenance Tax).
9 See Fujitsu Gen. Am. Inc. v. United States, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1072 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 2000) (explaining that jurisdiction of the CIT was based on 28 U.S.C. § 1582(2) &
(3)).
10 See K-Mart v. Cartier, 485 U.S. 176, 182 (1988) (determining that the CIT and the
Federal District Courts exercised concurrent jurisdiction over challenges to Customs
regulations controlling the import of gray market goods given that the CIT has been
granted exclusive jurisdiction over the matters described in 28 U.S.C. § 1581); see also
Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 761 F.2d 1552, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (1986) (challenging
judgment of the CIT as a matter of law).

78

ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OFLEGAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 18:1

appropriate time to consider whether improvements can be made
to clarify the Court's responsibilities, solidify its role as the
nation's exclusive arbiter of international trade disputes, improve
the efficiency of its procedures, and ensure expanded access to
justice. This task will likely not only require changes to the
Customs Courts Act itself, but also changes to the Customs and
trade laws, and the CIT's rules and procedures. This paper
considers some of the ways in which the CIT's jurisdiction might
be expanded and improved.
I. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CUSTOMS DECISIONS
The Customs Courts Act of 1980 greatly expanded the CIT's
jurisdictional responsibilities,11 granting the Court exclusive
jurisdiction over antidumping and countervailing duty matters,
worker adjustment assistance cases, certain licensing matters
and a wide range of "residual" matters involving the
administration and enforcement of the Customs laws. 12 Congress
also provided the Court with limited jurisdiction to review
certain pre-importation rulings,1 3 as well as jurisdiction over
certain counterclaims, cross-claims and third-party actions. 14
While the CIT's jurisdictional mandate over actions to review
Customs' denial of protests remained largely unchanged, the
1980 Act gave the CIT expanded powers to wield in such cases.
These included the powers to grant equitable relief,15 to enter
money judgments, 16 and, perhaps most significantly, to order
such further administrative or adjudicative procedures as the
court considers necessary to enable it to reach the correct

11 See 145 CONG. REC. S13065 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1999) (noting that Congress has
expanded the CIT's powers).
12 See 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c) (1980) ("The Court of International Trade shall have
exclusive jurisdiction of any civil action commenced under § 516A of the Tariff Act of
1930."); 28 U.S.C. § 1581(d) (2003) (stating where the CIT will have power to review in
civil matters); 28 U.S.C. § 1581(g) (2003) (explaining that the CIT will have power to
review civil actions concerning broker license and discipline cases); 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)
(2003) (providing that the CIT will have exclusive jurisdiction in many other matters).
13 See 28 U.S.C. § 1581(h) (1980) (stating that the CIT will have exclusive jurisdiction
in civil matters prior to importation of the goods).
14 See 28 U.S.C. § 1583 (1980) (dealing with counterclaims, cross-claims and thirdparty actions).
15 See 28 U.S.C. § 2643(c) (1980) (providing that the CIT may order any form of relief
appropriate in civil actions).
16 See 28 U.S.C. § 2643(a) (1980) (stating that the CIT may enter money judgments).
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decision. 17 This latter mandate resulted in the landmark decision
in Jarvis Clark & Co. v. United States,18 which effectively ended
the infamous dual burden of proof, which had been imposed on
importers challenging Customs protest decisions.1 9
Following the expansion of the CIT's jurisdictional mandate,
and removal of the "dual" burden of proof, 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a)

protest cases continued to be staples of the Court's workload
throughout the 1980's and early 1990's.20 Statutory amendments
and court decisions expanded the relief granted successful
plaintiffs in these cases, for example with respect to the payment
of interest on Court-ordered duty refunds. 2 1 Given the steady
growth in the volume of international trade during the past two
decades, plus the adoption of a "new" Customs valuation statute
in 1980 and the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States
in 1988, one might reasonably have expected that Customs
protest litigation would continue to account for a significant
proportion of the Court's output. Yet in recent years, decisions in
"protest" cases have represented a declining portion of the
Court's teaching in published opinions. 22
Surely the decline does not reflect a lack of public interest in
Customs law matters; importers and other interested parties
bombard the Customs Service each year with thousands of

17 See 28 U.S.C. § 2643(b) (1980) (explaining that the court may do things necessary
to reach a correct decision).
18 733 F.2d 873, 874 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (holding that the CIT is required to decide the
correctness of importer's proposed classification and the government's classification).
19 See, e.g., W.T. Grant & Co. v. United States, 38 C.C.P.A. 57, 60 (1950) (noting that
the importer challenging a Customs' decision had the burden to prove the decision wrong
by overcoming the statutory presumption of correctness and establish that its own
proffered alternative was correct).
20 See, e.g., Innotech Aviation v. United States, 21 Ct. Int'l Trade 1392, 1400 (1997)
(regarding a protest after removal of the dual burden of proof).
21 See 19 U.S.C. § 1505(b) & (c) (describing policies with respect to collection or refund
of duties, fees and interest due upon liquidation and interest); see also Travenol
Laboratories, Inc. v. United States, 118 F.3d 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (applying 19 U.S.C.
§ 1505(c) as amended).
22 Of course, many 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) actions are disposed of through the entry of
Stipulated Judgments on Agreed Statements of Fact, pursuant to Court of International
Trade Rule 58.1. When these dispositions are taken into account, the fact is that § 1581(a)
cases continue to account for the majority of the Court's dispositions, viewed in absolute
number terms. But many Stipulated Judgments are entered in "suspended" cases, which
involve the same issues of law, and/or facts, which were decided in designated "test cases."
See U.S. Ct. Int'l Trade R.84. Where Stipulated Judgments are entered in cases other
than "suspended" cases, they usually represent a settlement agreed on by the parties,
rather than judicial decision-making.
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requests for interpretative rulings on Customs law issues. 2 3 Nor
does the decline reflect universal satisfaction with Customs'
administrative rulings, for a high proportion of such rulings are
adverse to the requester and result in, or from, administrative
protests against Customs decisions.
For several reasons,
however, importers are apparently unwilling to carry their
battles with Customs through the courthouse door.
Accordingly, one area deserving of consideration is how the
CIT's governing statutes and rules might be changed to make
judicial review of Customs determinations more widely available
and economical to the trading public.
A.

FactorsLimiting Customs Litigation

Despite the expansion of import trade, several "environmental"
factors have limited the apparent willingness of traders to pursue
claims before the Court of International Trade. In reviewing
these factors, it is fair to ask whether these changes mean that
Customs issues have become less important and therefore less
deserving of judicial review, or whether judicial review
procedures should be changed to accommodate the new realities
of import trade.
1. Lower Duty Rates
As Congress noted in 1980, multilateral trade negotiations - at
that time, the "Tokyo Round" - had resulted in lower duty rates,
and an expected diminution in the importance of classification
and valuation cases before the CIT.24 The past two decades have
seen further dramatic reductions in tariff rates resulting from
the "Uruguay Round" multilateral negotiations, concluded in
1994, and from the United States' adoption of numerous
multilateral, bilateral and unilateral tariff elimination programs,
23 In an amicus curiae brief filed with the United States Supreme Court in United
States v. Mead Corporation,the Customs and International Trade Bar Association noted
that, during the 12 month period from July 1998 to June 1999, the Customs Service
issued some 12,557 rulings, 1,328 emanating from Customs Headquarters, and the
balance issued by the agency's field offices, including 10,986 classification rulings. See
Brief of Amicus Curiae the Customs and International Trade Bar Association at 6, United
States v. Mead Corporation,533 U.S. 218, 224 (2001) (No. 99-1434).
24 See generally D.M. McRae and J.C. Thomas, The GATT and Multilateral Treaty
Making: The Tokyo Round, 77 A.J.I.L. 51, 73 (1983) (discussing the Tokyo Round as a
multilateral treaty which gained tariff compromises).
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including the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA),
the United States-Israel Free Trade Agreement (IFTA), the
Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (CBERA), the Andean
Trade Preference Act (ATPA), the African Growth and
Opportunity Act (AGOA), the Information Technology Agreement
(ITA) and several others. 2 5 While there has been some litigation
concerning whether particular goods satisfy the requirements of
trade preference statutes, the overall reduction or elimination of
tariffs on many goods necessarily means that tariff classification
and valuation issues have waned in overall importance. 26 Stated
simply, there are fewer "big money" Customs law issues which
importers are willing to litigate-given the cost and nature of
modern Customs litigation.
Any businessperson considering litigation must weigh the
benefits of seeking judicial vindication of his or her rights against
the costs of seeking such vindication. In this regard, "protest
case" litigation before the CIT has arguably become
unnecessarily complex and expensive-at least for some types of
actions.
The strict time limits governing the CIT's jurisdiction mean
that litigants must often file multiple lawsuits in order to secure
complete relief. Administrative protests must be filed within
ninety (90) days after Customs' liquidation or reliquidation of an
import entry, denial of a drawback claim, or other "protestable"
decision; 2 7 the litigant must file a Summons with the CIT within
180 days of the mailing of notice of denial of its protest. 2 8 Both
statutory deadlines must ordinarily be satisfied before the CIT
29
may exercise jurisdiction over the importer's protest action.
25 See generally David A. Gantz, A Post-Uruguay Round Introduction to International
Trade Law in the United States, 12 ARIZ.J. INT'L & COMP. LAW 7, 17-18 (1995) (providing
a detailed discussion with respect to US customs and tariff laws).
26 Certainly, issues that might be relevant in other Customs law contexts have lost
importance in 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) "protest" actions. Thus, for example, in 3V, Inc. v.
United States, 83 F.Supp. 2d 1351, 1353 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1999) the Court dismissed as
moot a protest action that sought a judicial determination concerning which of two dutyfree tariff provisions most accurately classified an imported product. See id. The Court
ruled that the lack of a Constitutionally justiciable controversy as to which specific relief
could be granted rendered the action subject to dismissal, notwithstanding that the
proper classification of the merchandise at bar was the subject of a parallel Customs
penalty proceeding. See id. at 1355.
27 See 19 U.S.C. § 1514 (2003) (listing protest filing guidelines).
28 See 28 U.S.C. § 2636(a)(1) (1980) (noting that without compliance an action
contesting denial will be barred).
29 See 28 U.S.C. § 2637(d) (1980). The CIT may waive the exhaustion of
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Where an importer enters merchandise over a long period of
time, or at many different ports of entry, it often must file
multiple actions in the CIT in order to preserve its right to
complete relief, even though the importer may only wish to
litigate a single issue common to all such actions. 3 0 The filing of
multiple lawsuits results in multiple filing fees, as well as costs
and delays attendant in the resulting calendar and motion
practice (for example, designating "test cases" pursuant to Court
of International Trade Rule 84 and "suspending" actions
thereunder, consolidating actions, filing motions to extend a
case's time on the Court's Rule 83 Reserve Calendar, and seeking
miscellaneous stays and extensions of time).
Costs incurred in litigating a protest case before the Court can
be quite substantial. Even a simple tariff classification case can
engender extensive documentary discovery, interrogatories, lay
and expert depositions and other pretrial activities. This is often
the case, regardless of whether a case is tried or submitted for
decision on a motion for summary judgment or other dispositive
motion. Pretrial discovery can be extensive and expensive even
in tariff classification cases where the only question presented
involves the "common meaning" of a tariff term - a matter which
is presumed to be within the understanding of the Court, 3 1 and
administrative remedies where appropriate, but has generally done this only where the
plaintiff has demonstrated that requiring exhaustion of such remedies would be futile or
inappropriate. See Cemex, S.A. v. United States, 133 F.3d 897, 905 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
However, the Court has consistently ruled that the time limits in protest cases are
jurisdictional, and not subject to waiver or extension, so an importer who has failed to
meet either of the deadlines is unsuited. See id.
30 Importers can attempt to avoid duplicative lawsuits by asking Customs officials at
ports of entry to withhold action on protests pending the CIT's resolution of a legal issue.
Customs officials may withhold action, but are under no obligation to do so. Even if an
importer prevails before the CIT or the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Customs
officials may delay for years before disposing of protests in accordance with the court's
decision. By contrast, where duty refunds are mandated by a court judgment, Customs
officials are under a duty to implement the judgment promptly, or risk sanctions for
contempt of court. See, e.g., D&M Watch Corp. v. United States, 795 F. Supp. 1160, 1172
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1992).
Where a protest involves certain issues which do not result from the statutory liquidation
of an import entry (for example, the denial of a claim for drawback), an importer who asks
Customs to delay action on protests pending the outcome of a pending lawsuit may
thereby sacrifice its right to receive interest on refunds pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2644. See,
e.g., Hartog Foods Int'l Inc. v. United States, 291 F.3d 789 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (finding that
the statutory provision for drawback refunds, however, did not transform properly paid
duties and fees into excessive monies subject to interest awards); Novacor Chemicals Inc.
v. United States, 171 F.2d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (statutory interest under 19 U.S.C. §
1505(c) not available on drawback refunds).
31 The "common meaning" of a tariff term is always presumed to be a matter within
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as to which the plaintiff challenging Customs' decision bears no
burden of proof. 32 In such cases, there is little more to do than
identify the merchandise at issue before the Court, and advance
purely legal arguments in aid of the Court's determination.
However, the CIT's discovery rules make no distinctions between
cases based on the issues involved, so parties often incur great
expense in pretrial activities before even simple questions are
submitted for judicial decision.
The sheer volume of ruling requests submitted to the Customs
Service each year furnishes ample evidence that importers and
others have a keen interest in resolving Customs law issues of
interest to their companies. There is also evidence, however, that
CIT procedures are perceived as cumbersome, and dissuade
companies with legitimate grievances from seeking judicial
review. Whether the Court can adopt streamlined procedures for
the litigation of modern protest actions, without compromising
litigants' rights, is a matter deserving of serious consideration.
2. Changes in Customs Practices: Post Liquidation Duty
Collections
In the decades since the Customs Courts Act of 1980 was
enacted, the United States Customs Service has implemented
dramatic changes in the way it carries out its duty-collection
mandate. Substantial sums of contested duties are now collected
outside of the traditional "liquidation and protest" procedures
that provide the jurisdictional predicate for 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a)
actions. Existing procedures for judicial review of Customs
decisions do not account for the changes in the agency's practices.
At the time the Customs Courts Act of 1980 came into being and for over a century before - Customs entries were individually
and actively reviewed by import specialists, appraisers, or other
agency personnel, who made decisions regarding
the
classification, appraised value and admissibility of merchandise
before liquidating the entry. The rule of "finality of liquidation"
judicial knowledge, although the Court may consult dictionaries, treatises and other
references to aid its understanding, and may also seek advisory testimony. See, e.g.,
Brookside Veneers, Inc. v. United States, 847 F.2d 786, 788-89 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 943 (1988).
32 See Universal Electronics, Inc. v. United States, 112 F.3d 488, 492 (Fed. Cir. 1997)
(discussing burden of proof issues).
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was well entrenched in Customs law. Absent actual fraud by the
importer, 33 an entry was considered to be final as to both
Customs and the importer, unless, within 90 days after
liquidation, (1) Customs reliquidated the entry pursuant to 19
U.S.C. § 1501, or (2) the importer filed a protest pursuant to 19
U.S.C. § 1514.34 The prospect of a truly "final" liquidation forced
Customs officials to carefully scrutinize entries, and to identify
all possible issues at the time of liquidation or reliquidation. The
importer then had an opportunity to confront these issues by
filing a timely protest, with assurance that it had protected its
rights and embarked upon a well-established path to judicial
review of Customs' decision.
Beginning in the early 1980's, however, Customs concluded
that it lacked sufficient personnel to conduct entry-by-entry
review of the dramatically expanding volume of import entries.
Given workload problems, and a new statutory mandate to
entries within fixed time limits, 35 Customs
liquidate
implemented a policy known variously as "automatic bypass" of
liquidation, or "entry selectivity." 36 Today, Customs allows the
vast majority of import entries to liquidate "as entered" by the
importer, without any active consideration by agency
personnel. 3 7 To ensure importer compliance with applicable laws
and regulations, Customs has increasingly relied on post-entry
audits of importers, which are usually conducted long after the
entry had been liquidated and made "final."
However, the notion that liquidated entries are "final" as to the
government after 90 days has long been laid to rest by § 592(d) of
the Tariff Act of 1930,38 as added by the Customs Procedural
33 See 19 U.S.C. §1521 (1993) (repealed Dec. 1993). Even in cases where Customs
asserted that the importer had committed actual fraud, the statutory remedy was a
reliquidation of the entry, against which the importer could lodge a protest. In actions
arising from such protests, Customs bore the initial burden of proving that actual fraud
had occurred; the burden of establishing the correct classification, value, etc., rested with
the importer. See, e.g., A.N. Deringer, Inc. v. United States, 59 Cust. Ct. 148, 149 (1967).
34 See 19 U.S.C. § 1514(c)(3) (1999) (setting forth protest filing procedures).
35 See 19 U.S.C. § 1504(d) (1996), as added by the Customs ProceduralReform and
Simplification Act of 1978 (providing six.month timeframe for liquidation of entries).
36 See generally David M. Cohen, A Review of Recent Decisions of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit:Area Summary: InternationalTrade Decisions of
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit During 1989, 39 AM.U.L.REV.
1211, 1228-29 (1990) (noting the one year time frame within which Customs must work).
37 See id. (explaining the circumstances under which the standard timeframe may be
expanded).
38 19 U.S.C. § 1592(d) (2003) provides as follows:
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Reform and Simplification Act of 1978.39 § 1592(d) permits
Customs officials to require the restoration of "lawful duties,
taxes or fees" in cases where the agency determines that an
importer or other person has failed to pay these charges as a
result of a violation of the Customs laws. 40 Customs is
empowered to demand the restoration of such "lawful duties"
regardless of whether the claimed violation of law resulted from
simple negligence, gross negligence or intentional fraud, and
regardless of whether a monetary penalty was imposed for the
violation. 4 1 Initially, the courts ruled that there was no statute of
limitations on an action by Customs to collect 19 U.S.C. § 1592(d)
"withheld duties" from an importer; subsequently, Congress
amended the Tariff Act to provide that such actions were subject
to the same statute of limitations - five (5) years or longer - for
2
actions by Customs to collect civil penalties.4
Not surprisingly, § 1592(d) has become one of Customs' most
powerful tools for exacting duties from importers. In many cases,
the agency's mere threat to employ the statute has been used to
coerce monies from importers who might otherwise rely on the
statutory finality of liquidation. The path by which an importer
may seek judicial review and recovery of monies paid pursuant to
§ 1592(d) is unclear; indeed, the Government asserts that no such
path exists. Customs' increasing reliance on post-liquidation duty
demands, coupled with the lack of a clear path for importers to
seek review of those demands, has prevented legitimate Customs
law disputes from being presented to the CIT for resolution.
While 19 U.S.C. § 1592(d) states that the Customs Service
"shall require"43 the restoration of duties, taxes or fees, the law is
(d) Deprivation of lawful duties, taxes or fees
Notwithstanding § 514 of this title, if the United States has been deprived of lawful
duties, taxes or fees as a result of a violation of sub§ (a) of this §, the Customs Service
shall require that such lawful duties, taxes or fees be restored, whether or not a
monetary penalty is assessed.
39 See Pub L. 95-410, 95th Cong., 2d. Sess., 92 Stat. 888.
40 See id. (transcribing the text of statute).
41 See Kenneth G. Weigel, Significant New Developments Every Business Lawyer
Should Know About Customs Law, 27 INVL LAW. 177, 187 (1993) (stating Customs may
require that lawful duties be restored, regardless of whether a monetary penalty had been
imposed).
42 See 19 U.S.C. § 1621 (2003) (imposing a statute of limitations of five years, except
in the case of forfeiture where an action must be initiated within two years).
43 See 19 U.S.C. § 1592(d) (2003) (stating that restoration is required "whether or not
a monetary penalty is assessed").
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silent concerning how Customs should do this. The first words of
the subsection make clear that Customs should require
restoration "[n]otwithstanding § 1514 of this title . .. ."44 This
reference, plus the establishment of a five (5) year statute of
limitations for actions to recover § 1592(d) monies, makes clear
that the "finality of liquidation" of an entry will not bar the
making or enforcement of a demand under § 1592(d).45 Customs
might have interpreted the mandate of § 1592(d) as requiring a
new "liquidation" of the affected entries, which would
presumably have permitted the importer to lodge a protest
against the demand.46 Customs did not so interpret the law,
however, and its regulations merely provide that the appropriate
Customs "field officer" will require the "deposit" of such duties
with Customs, whether or not a monetary penalty is assessed. 47
Armed with 19 U.S.C. § 1592(d), Customs auditors and other
officials have not hesitated to demand or suggest that importers
pay contested duties long after entries have been liquidated and
presumably made "final." Customs personnel routinely suggest
that if payment of such duties is not made voluntarily, the
agency will bring a formal demand for restoration under 19
U.S.C. § 1592(d) - and that such demand will be coupled with a
44 19 U.S.C. § 1592(d) (2003).
45 See Robert T. Givens & Rayburn Berry, United States Customs Law Affecting the
Movement Of Goods Into and Out of Mexico, 23 ST. MARY'S L.J. 773, 907-08 (1993) (stating
that the remedy under § 1592 voids the finality of liquidation under § 1514).
46 In this regard, it is noteworthy that, while Customs' power to "liquidate" an entry
derives from 19 U.S.C. § 1500 (directing the Customs Service to appraise, classify and
determinate the rate and amount of duty applicable to entered merchandise, and then
'liquidate the entry and reconciliation, if any, of such merchandise"), 19 U.S.C. § 1514
operates primarily as a limitation on the finality of the liquidation decision. The
statement in 19 U.S.C. § 1592(d) that Customs' power to require restoration of monies
operates "notwithstanding § 1514" could fairly be read as an exception to the "finality" of
previous liquidations, and not as a direction to Customs to make an assessment of duty
without regarding to the 19 U.S.C. § 1500 "liquidation" mechanism.
47 See 19 C.F.R. § 162.79b, which provides in pertinent part that:
162. 79b. Recovery of actual loss of duties, taxes or fees or actual loss of revenue
Whether or not a monetary penalty is assessed under this subpart, the appropriate
Customs field officer will require the deposit of any actual loss of duties, taxes or fees
resulting from a violation of § 592, Tariff Act of 1930, as amended or any actual loss
of revenue resulting from a violation of § 593A, Tariff Act of 1930, as amended,
notwithstanding that the liquidation of the entry to which the loss is attributable has
become final.
The demand is communicated to the importer by written notice from the Customs field
officer. See id. The regulation further provides that "Any determination of actual loss of
duties, taxes or fees or actual loss of revenue under this § is subject to review upon
written application to the Commissioner of Customs" but no mechanism is specified for
contesting the Commissioner's determination. See id.
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demand for monetary penalties equal to a multiple of the duties
demanded.
Customs law practitioners are well aware of the delicate, and
sometimes elaborate, negotiations, which often follow the
conclusion of Customs audits and investigations, in which
Customs officials recommend that importers pay "withheld
duties" on entries which have long been liquidated and made
final under 19 U.S.C. § 1514.48 Given the current state of the
law, they must necessarily counsel their clients that:
(1) payments to Customs which are determined to be
"voluntary" will likely not be protestable, or recoverable in
Court;
(2) there are no reported appellate decisions in which a
demand for duties under § 1592(d) has been ruled to be a
protestable "exaction49;"
(3) the issuance of a formal § 1592(d) demand will likely be
coupled with a demand for § 1592(a) penalties; and
(4) the only certain way to seek judicial review of a § 1592(d)
demand is to refuse payment and be sued in the CIT as a
defendant in a 28 U.S.C. § 1582 action to recover the duties
50
(and often face a claim for penalties as well).
Not surprisingly, faced with such circumstances, importers
often acquiesce in Customs' post-liquidation duty demand, even
where their positions are meritorious, and would have been
raised by protest had Customs demanded the monies during the
liquidation process.
The threat of substantial 19 U.S.C. § 1592(a) penalties also
48 See generally Investigations: Making The Right Moves, 144 N.J.L.J. 1126 (1996)
(suggesting that importers undertake affirmative duties, including internal audits and
hire customs law experts to investigate the propriety of their actions).
49 Recently, however, in Brother Int'l Corp. v. United States, 246 F. Supp. 2d 1318 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 2003), the Court held that an importer could protest a Customs demand for
withheld duties, in order to contest the agency's failure to allow a claim for an offset with
respect to the amount of duties due. The Court concluded that since the payment was not
made voluntarily, and was not made as part of a settlement of Customs penalty demands,
it constituted a protestable exaction. As of this writing, no final judgment has been
rendered in this case, and it remains to be seen whether the government will appeal from
the Court's decision to allow the protest.
50 See 19 U.S.C. 1514 (2003) (outlining the process for protesting decisions by the
Customs Service).
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motivates many importers to make "prior disclosures" to
Customs of possible violations of the Customs laws involving
entries which are liquidated and otherwise final, using the
procedures set out in 19 U.S.C. § 1592(c)(4). A "prior disclosure"
reduces or eliminates the importer's potential liability for
monetary penalties.51 However, Customs' regulations require
that the person making such disclosure tender any "withheld
duties" as a condition of receiving "prior disclosure" treatment. 5 2
Where a party seeking to make a "prior disclosure" is unsure
whether its conduct constitutes a violation of law, or whether
duties are due as a result of its violation, the law provides no
clear path for the disclosing party to seek judicial review.
Although Customs' post-liquidation duty demands have
increased markedly since the Customs Courts Act of 1980 was
enacted, the courts have not articulated a clear path whereby
importers can bring suit to contest these demands. On several
occasions, the Court has held that, when an importer voluntarily
tenders duties for "finally liquidated" entries to Customs during
an investigation, whether or not in connection with a "prior
disclosure," such voluntary payment may not be protested, and
the importer may not commence an action in the CIT to recover
the payment. 53
51 See Lynn S. Baker & Michael E. Roll, Securing Judicial Review in the United
States Court of International Trade: Has Conoco, Inc. v. United States Broadened the
JurisdictionalBoundaries?, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 726, 758 n.176 (1995) (stating that a
prior disclosure encourages the reporting of violations to Customs where penalties are
imposed).
52 See 19 C.F.R. § 162.74(c) (1984). The CIT has confirmed that, where an importer
fails or refuses to deposit 19 U.S.C. § 1592(d) "withheld duties" with Customs, it may be
deniedthe benefits of "prior disclosure" under 19 U.S.C. § 1592(c)(4). See Pentax Corp. v.
Robison, 924 F. Supp. 193 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1996), rev'd on other grounds, 125 F.3d 1457
(Fed. Cir. 1997).
53 See, e.g., Tikal Distributing Corp. v. United States, 970 F. Supp. 1056 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1997); Shiepe v. United States, 866 F. Supp. 1430 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1994); Miami
Free Zone Corp. v. United States, 17 CIT 687 (1993); Halperin Shipping Co., Inc. v United
States, 14 Ct. Int'l Trade 438 (1990); ITT Semiconductors v. United States, 6 Ct. Int'l
Trade 231, 236-38 (1983); Carlingswitch v. United States, 500 F. Supp. 223, 227 (Cust. Ct.
1980), aff'd, 651 F.2d 768 (C.C.P.A. 1981).
In Tikal, the Court suggested that if "withheld duties" were tendered under conditions
where the tender was clearly involuntary, the Customs demand for payment might
constitute a protestable "exaction." However, no reported decision has in fact found a 19
U.S.C. § 1592(d) demand to be such an exaction, leaving importers unsure of whether, and
when, they might deposit such monies with Customs and proceed to the CIT with a
reasonable confidence that their lawsuit seeking a refund of the deposited monies would
be entertained.
While there is one reported decision of the CIT which suggests that a plaintiff invoked
the Court's 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) jurisdiction by protesting a demand for monies made at the
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Judicial frustration over the lack of importer-initiated
remedies to challenge post-liquidation Customs demands was
evident in Bridalane Fashions,Inc. v. United States,54 a case in
which an importer was asked to deposit withheld duties as a
condition of receiving "prior disclosure" treatment for marking
violations. 55 The importer did not believe that the duties
demanded were subject to a demand for restoration under 19
U.S.C. § 1592(d), but feared that, if it "voluntarily" deposited the
monies with Customs, it would lose the right to initiate a lawsuit
to seek their recovery. The importer then invoked the CIT's 28
U.S.C. § 1581(i) residual jurisdiction, seeking to deposit the
disputed monies with the Court pending resolution of the
underlying legal issue. The Bridalane Court admitted this was a
valid concern (". . . it also remains a possibility that if the duties

were received by Customs, 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) jurisdiction [to
hear a protest against an exaction of monies] were not available,
and Customs were found to be wrong in requiring the duties,
they could not be recovered"), 56 and asserted jurisdiction over the
case. The Court noted that the issue of whether and how it could
assume jurisdiction over challenges to post-liquidation duty
assessments was in "considerable turmoil," and attributed this
difficulty in part to "Customs' lack of clear regulatory procedures
and timetables for protesting post-disclosure exactions of duties
under 19 U.S.C. § 1592."57 The Bridalane court's criticism would
be equally valid if applied to all Customs post-liquidation duty
demands, whether or not a "prior disclosure" is involved.
conclusion of a Customs audit, [Princess Cruises, Inc. v. United States, 22 Ct. Int'l Trade
498 (1998), rev'd on other grounds 201 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2000)], the basis for the
Court's assertion of jurisdiction in the case was not articulated clearly enough to provide a
blueprint for potential litigants. Moreover, the sums demanded in that case [Harbor
Maintenance Tax and fees on passenger carriage] are not of the kind covered by 19 U.S.C.
§ 1500 entry liquidations, so the case furnishes little guidance for firms concerned with
import duties. See id. at 500.
54 32 F.Supp.2d 466 (1998). In this case, plaintiff imported wedding gowns into the
US, which he had designated were made in Canada. See id. at 467. Plaintiff took
advantage of reduced duty rates under NAFTA, but the gowns had in fact been made in
the Far East. See id.
55 See United States v. Yuchius Morality Co., Ltd., 2002 Ct. Int'l Trade LEXIS 123, at
*29 (citing Bridalane for the proposition that it is unclear whether the law supports
defendant Yuchius' position that by paying a duty amount which it believed was greater
than owed, refusal by the IRS to later offer a refund would not have been protestable).
56 BridalaneFashions, Inc., 32 F.Supp.2d at 471 (asserting that Congress conferred
jurisdiction upon the court by either 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i) or § 1581(a)).
57 Id. at 470 (stating that deciding issues of prior disclosure and recovery of duties are
at the heart of the court's jurisdictional powers).
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More than two decades after the Customs Courts Act of 1980,
therefore, the only certain way for an importer to secure judicial
review of Customs post-liquidation duty demands is to defend an
action by Customs seeking recovery of the contested duties in an
5
action falling under the CIT's 28 U.S.C. § 1582 jurisdiction. 8
Since a Customs lawsuit seeking restoration of withheld duties
will typically be coupled with a demand for much greater
monetary penalties, importers will frequently feel compelled to
accede to the government's "withheld duty" demands, rather than
expose themselves to potential additional liability for penalties,
and costs of litigating penalty-related issues of culpability.
Since many of the issues underlying post-liquidation duty
demands are representative of those which might otherwise be
raised by protest - the classification or appraised value of
merchandise, for example - the lack of a clear path to judicial
review of post-liquidation duty demands limits the number of
instances where the CIT is called upon to consider Customs law
disputes. Moreover, since these post-liquidation disputes may
involve several years' worth of import transactions, they often
represent the Customs disputes where the economic stakes are
highest.
3. Judicial Deference to Agency Regulations and Rulings
Recent decades have brought a sharp increase in the issuance
of Customs interpretative regulations, as well as published
Customs Service rulings interpreting and administering the
Customs laws. These trends have significantly changed the way
in which Customs disputes wind their way to the CIT. The
United States Supreme Court's decisions in United States v.
60
HaggarApparel, Inc.,59 and United States v. Mead Corporation,
obligating the courts to accord deference to these administrative
pronouncements, may dissuade importers from pursuing judicial
review of Customs issues in the future.
58 The Courts have at least suggested that, in 28 U.S.C. § 1582 actions to recover
penalties and withheld duties; importers can raise claims of "offset" with respect to the
specific entries covered by the government's complaint. See United States v. Menard, Inc.,
64 F.3d 678 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
59 526 U.S. 380, 391 (1999) (stating that courts can give these regulations deference
without impairing the court's authority to decide questions of fact).
60 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001) (stating that when Congress delegates authority to an
agency, its regulations generally bind the courts).
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Before the 1970's, a high proportion of Customs issues
presented to the courts emanated directly from ports of entry,
following the denial of importers' protests.
Customs
Headquarters review of protested issues was limited to selected
cases, and was largely invisible from the courts' perspective.
While Customs decisions were presumed to be correct, this
presumption carried little evidentiary weight, and the Courts did
not accord any deference to the agency's legal views, whether
those views were recorded in regulations or administrative
rulings. The CIT and Federal Circuit were viewed by the
importing public as having an expertise in Customs matters at
least equal to that of the agency. As a result of the Haggar
decision and, to a lesser extent, the Mead case, the importing
public now perceives that the Court's expertise has in some way
been subordinated to the will of Customs. 6 1
In Haggar, the Supreme Court ruled that, despite their
specialized focus and presumed expertise, the customs courts (the
CIT and the Federal Circuit) were required to defer to Customs'
interpretative regulations. The degree of deference was that
specified in Chevron USA Inc. v. National Resources Defense
Council,62 which requires a reviewing court to defer to an agency
interpretation so long as it is "reasonable," and does not conflict
with the clearly expressed intent of Congress. This requirement
of deference has provoked angry criticism from at least one judge
of the CIT.63 It undoubtedly weakens the value of the CIT's
expertise in Customs matters and arguably diminishes the need
for a specialized Federal Court to handle Customs matters.
Importers are keenly aware that the Haggar decision may limit
their chances of prevailing before the CIT in cases where
Customs has elected to codify its interpretation of law in a
regulation. 6 4
61 See Donna M. Lach, The Gray Market and the Customs Regulation - Is the
Controversy Really Over After K-Mart Corp v. Cartier, Inc.?, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 221,
246 (1989) (stating that Customs has received criticism because of their lack of expertise
in antitrust law).
62 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
63 See Levi Strauss & Co. v. United States, 133 F. Supp. 2d 693, 694 (Ct. Int'l. Trade
2001) ("Thus an agency employee, who may have little or no background in the law, is
now both the enforcer and interpreter of the law.").
64 See Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States, 258 F.3d 1340, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (rejecting
the importer's argument and affirming the Court of International Trade's holding that a
dumping margin rate calculation should reflect use of a single importer or multiple
importers).
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The more recent Supreme Court decision in Mead could also
dissuade importers from initiating Customs litigation in the CIT.
In Mead, the Supreme Court declined to accord Chevron-type
deference to Customs interpretative rulings, but held that such
rulings should be accorded judicial "respect" under the doctrine of
Skidmore v.

Swift

&

Co.65

[courts should

accord agency

interpretations "respect... but only to the extent those
interpretations have the 'power to persuade"'].66
This lesser
degree of deference does not measurably diminish the CIT's scope
or standard of review - it merely articulates the unexceptional
rule that a persuasive interpretation by an agency (or any other
litigant) should receive careful judicial consideration. Still,
because importers make such extensive use of Customs' "rulings"
program, the fact that the Supreme Court has required any
deference to agency rulings may lead importers to believe that it
will be difficult to convince courts to reach different conclusions.
It is perhaps too early to say whether the Haggar and Mead
rulings will have a quantifiable impact on the number of 28
U.S.C. § 1581(a) actions filed in the CIT. However, the importing
public's perception is that the decisions will diminish the courts'
power to overturn Customs protest decisions, and may dissuade
importers from turning to the courts for assistance.
B. Reforming and Expanding JudicialReview of Customs Service
Decisions

In some ways, the regulatory framework established by the
Tariff Act of 1930 and the jurisdictional scheme set out by the
Customs Courts Act of 1980 no longer reflect how many Customs

law controversies develop today. A generation after the 1980 Act
"modernized" the practice of Customs law, it is fair to ask how
laws and court rules might be amended to promote the more
widespread and efficient litigation of Customs cases.
Some of the suggestions set out herein would require Congress
to amend the laws governing the activities of the Customs
authorities and the courts; other changes might be implemented
65 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
66 See id. at 140 (explaining that the power to persuade depends on the "thoroughness
evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning [and] its consistency with earlier
and later pronouncements").
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by regulation, or by changes to court rules. Obviously, there are
several alternatives which might achieve broader access to
judicial review of Customs matters; the observations and
proposals set out below are intended solely as a starting point, to
stimulate discussion among the bench, bar and international
trading community.
1. Simplified Procedures for Certain Customs Litigation
Lower duty rates, coupled with the need for importers to file
repetitive actions in order to litigate Customs issues, have
reduced the number of instances where it is cost-effective to
litigate these issues before the Court of International Trade.
Absent negotiated settlements, however, the CIT's rules
currently recognize a single form of action in Customs cases, and
require that these cases be tried, or submitted for decision upon a
dispositive motion (typically a Rule 56 Motion for Summary
Judgment). Either way, plaintiffs must usually conduct lengthy
and expensive discovery before framing a Customs case for
judicial determination, following strict rules of evidence.
In years past, recommendations have surfaced for the
establishment of a CIT "Small Claims" part, using simplified
procedures, to handle certain Customs cases.
These
recommendations have generally been rejected, typically on the
ground that a given case involving a small amount of duties
might involve an issue having a greater nationwide impact. This
rationale, however, hardly seems applicable to classification
cases, where CIT decisions have no res judicata effect, even on
subsequent cases involving the same issues and identical
merchandise. 6 7 Moreover, the government routinely settles cases
pursuant to Rule 58.1-Stipulated Judgments on Agreed
Statements of Fact, which are available for public inspection, but
which have no precedential value.
It is not suggested here that the CIT establish a "Small
Claims" part.
However, the Court should give serious
consideration to amending its Rules to provide litigants with an
option of submitting protested Customs matters, particularly
67 See, e.g., United States v. Stone & Downer, Inc., 274 U.S. 225, 233-34 (1927)
(noting that fact finding and issue adjudication by the Court of Customs Appeals are not
resjudicataon subsequent importation disputes with identical facts and similar issues).
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classification cases, for decision on the basis of simplified
procedures - featuring limited discovery, and informal, on the
Litigants
record hearings in lieu of trials, for example.
submitting their cases for decision under such procedures would
stipulate that the decisions rendered therein would affect only
the specific transactions covered thereby, and would have no
stare decisis or other precedential value. Litigants would also
waive their right to appeal from the decision rendered under
such procedures-either absolutely, or for all issues except purely
legal ones. 68
Most other countries that provide specialized judicial review of
Customs determinations do not provide for a full-blown trial of
such issues in the first instance. In Canada, for example, the
Canadian International Trade Tribunal (CITT), a quasi-judicial
body, decides a wide range of classification, appraisement and
other Customs appeals on the basis of information developed in
hearings which are not trial-type hearings, and which are not
conducted according to strict rules of evidence. The CITT's
decisions may be appealed to Canada's Federal Courts, which
apply a sliding scale of deference in reviewing the Tribunal's
determinations. In The Netherlands, Customs appeals were
formerly lodged with the Tariff Commission, a specialized tax
court, which did not require the parties to follow strict rules of
evidence in presenting their cases. While the Tariff Commission
has recently been integrated into the High Court of Amsterdam
(Customs Chamber), the Court still uses relatively informal
procedures to review Customs matters. 6 9 In England, Customs
determinations are first appealed to VAT and Duties Appeals
Tribunals, which conduct quasi-judicial inquiries before
rendering decisions (which may be appealed in national courts).
In India, Customs matters are decided by the specialized
68 Due to de novo determination of legal issues in the Federal Circuit, the absence of a
fully developed factual record is less likely to impede appellate review of such issues. But
see Berkley v. United States, 287 F.3d 1076, 1092 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Dyk, J. dissenting)
(reiterating that less developed factual records may lead to sweeping decisions by the
courts).
69 Of course, in the European Union, national courts may refer specific issues in
Customs cases for decision by the European Court of Justice in Luxembourg. See Jeffrey
C. Cohen, The European Preliminary Reference and U.S. Supreme Court Review of State
Court Judgments: A Study in Comparative JudicialFederalism, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 421,
431 (1996) (explaining a customs conflict in French national court that was sent to the
European Court of Justice for resolution).
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Customs, Excise and Gold Appeals Tribunal (CEGAT), whose
procedures are neither as formalized nor as detailed as trial
procedures in the CIT.
Establishment of a quasi-judicial body to hear Customs cases
would of course require Congressional action. However, there are
no apparent barriers that would prevent the CIT from amending
its rules to adopt optional procedures for the resolution of
Customs cases in simplified proceedings. Such procedures could
standardize and limit discovery in Customs cases, and provide
for less formal hearings to educate the Court regarding the
nature of the merchandise or transactions at issue. The Court's
decisions in cases submitted for decision on simplified procedures
would be made available to the public, but would have no res
judicata or stare decisis effect and would not be citable as
precedent. It is likely that the majority of tariff classification
actions, for example, would be susceptible to decision using
simplified procedures.
Litigants would be free to pursue full-scale litigation in
Customs cases in lieu of using simplified procedures, but the
Court's rules could impose fee-shifting to parties who
unsuccessfully pursue such litigation, at least to the extent
discovery and other procedures in full-scale litigation exceed
those provided under "simplified" procedural rules.
The short statutes of limitations in Customs cases also
engender substantial motion and calendar practice, which drain
the resources of the Court. The need for importers to file
repetitive lawsuits limits the overall efficiency of the process. In
this regard, Congress might consider authorizing procedures
which would allow importers and Customs to contractually agree
that, once an issue has been framed for CIT determination, the
importer need not file further protests and lawsuits in order to
preserve its rights of judicial review. The Netherlands and other
European Union countries utilize these types of contractual
arrangements; they allow tribunals to devote their energies to
resolving contested issues of law and fact, rather than in
managing the way the parties formulate their dispute.
The adoption of simplified procedures for the disposition of
certain Customs cases might make the Court more accessible for
importers engaged in Customs disputes, and would further the
mandate in Court of International Trade Rule 1 that actions be
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resolved in a manner which is speedy, just and efficient.
Another change which would promote equity in Customs
litigation would be an amendment to § 514(a) of the Tariff Act to
extend, from 90 days to as much as three (3) years, the time in
which a Customs decision may be protested. 70 Such an
amendment would result in fewer (though larger) protests, and
presumably would eliminate the need for the filing of repetitive
cases in the CIT. It would also provide a vehicle for promoting
greater consolidation of claims presented to the court in Customs
matters. A three-year protest period may seem long, but is
consistent with the time allowed under the laws of Canada, the
European Union, and many other countries for challenging
Customs determinations. A longer protest period could also
promote equity in Customs matters, by giving importers time to
evaluate Customs issues more commensurate with that enjoyed
by Customs under 19 U.S.C. § 1592(d).
2. Litigation of Post-Liquidation Customs Assessments
As the Court of International Trade noted in Bridalane
Fashions, Inc. v. United States, there is "considerable turmoil"
regarding whether and how the Court may exercise jurisdiction
over post-liquidation duty demands and tenders. 71 Clarification
of this issue would do much to remove the confusion concerning
the Court's ability to consider many of the most contentious
issues, which arise in modern Customs practice.
The simplest way to resolve this issue would be for Congress to
amend §§ 514 and 592(d) of Tariff Act the to provide explicitly
that importers may protest (1) Customs demands for duties,
taxes and fees made in connection with Customs audits, and (2)
demands for "lawful duties, taxes and fees" made pursuant to §
1592(d). Such explicit legislative clarification would provide
helpful guidance to both industry and the Court, and would do
much to eliminate the coercive and threatening atmosphere that
currently
surrounds
many
post-liquidation
Customs
assessments. It would also provide for the resolution of Customs
law issues, at the importer's option, in a CIT action not
70 See 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a) (2003) (stating that decisions of the Customs Service are
final and conclusive unless protest is filed in accordance with § 1514(c)(3)).
71 See id. at 470 (suggesting that jurisdictional issues remain with regard to duty
recovery cases and penalties under 19 U.S.C. § 1592 (2003)).
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72
necessarily tainted by penalty issues.
Of course, the path to importer-initiated judicial review in such
cases may yet be illuminated by judicial decisions interpreting
existing law. The CIT's decisions in Tikal and Bridalane indicate
that importer-initiated judicial review may be available in cases
where post-liquidation payment of duties is made involuntarily,
pursuant to a Customs "exaction." However, the current
circumstances which dissuade importers from challenging postliquidation duty assessments could mean that it would take
many years before a comprehensive body of case law is developed
to guide importers in determining when post-liquidation
73
payments are "involuntary," and protestable.
A Congressional solution to this problem is likely to be the
swiftest and surest. Absent an amendment to the law, however,
the Court should, at the earliest possible opportunity, articulate
the principles governing judicial review of post-liquidation
assessments.

3. Judicial Review of Customs Rulings
A majority of Customs issues presented to the CIT today has
been preceded by Customs rulings. While the CIT continues to
review 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) cases de novo, on the basis of a record
made before the Court, the requirement of deference imposed by
the Supreme Court's Mead decision means that Customs rulings
will inevitably be injected into, and reviewed by, the CIT.
At present, the CIT conducts direct review of Customs rulings
only in cases brought pursuant to its 28 U.S.C. § 1581(h)
jurisdiction. Section 1581(h) permits the Court to conduct pre72 Presumably, in some importer-initiated actions challenging post-liquidation
assessments, the Customs Service could assert its claims for 19 U.S.C. § 1592 penalties as
counterclaims.
In other cases, however, it might be advisable for penalty claims to be heard separately
from the issues surrounding post-liquidation duty demands, particularly since some
penalty cases may be heard by juries, whereas jury trial is usually unavailable in
ordinary Customs actions. See, e.g., Washington Int'l Insurance Co. v. United States, 678
F. Supp. 902, 917 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988) (Re, C.J., dissenting) (arguing against a right to
jury trial in disputes over customs duties against the United States).
73 For example, it is questionable whether the government would ever concede a
payment to be involuntary if made during the course of a Customs audit, if no Customs
penalty proceeding had been initiated. See generally Daniel L. Fulkerson, Fundamentals
of Importing and the Customs Modernization Act, 5 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L. L. 335, 351
(1998) (discussing penalties that may be imposed for infractions by an importer during a
Customs audit).
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importation review of Customs rulings in cases where the
importer demonstrates that it would suffer irreparable harm if
forced to pursue traditional post-importation judicial review.
The record for review is limited to the record developed before
the agency. The CIT conducts its review on a deferential basis,
upholding the ruling unless it is found to be arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or not otherwise in accordance with law.
In § 1581(h) cases, the Court is limited to issuing declaratory
judgments, although one recent decision suggests that, in
appropriate cases, the Court may apply its decision to specific
import transactions. 74
In some cases where a Customs ruling has previously been
issued, a litigant who has already imported merchandise may be
interested solely in challenging Customs' conclusions of law. In
such cases, the standard and scope of review of 28 U.S.C. §
1581(h) cases might be employed, at the importer's election, in
resolving cases brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a).
An
amendment to the Court's governing statutes might be
considered to allow for the resolution of certain "protest"
disputes, at the parties' election, according to § 1581(h) standards
and procedures. The presence of actual protested Customs
decisions, which will be affected by the outcome of the case, will
satisfy concerns that there be an actual "case or controversy" to
be resolved by the Court.
C. Specific Recommendations for Change
1. Extend the Protest Period from the Current 90 Days to
Three (3) Years
Under current law, an importer dissatisfied with decisions of
the Customs Service can protest the liquidation of an entry
within 90 days of the date of such liquidation. 75 The Customs
Service has the same 90-day period within which to recall an
entry through reliquidation. 76 On its face therefore, the Tariff Act
74 See Heartland By-Products Inc. v. United States, 223 F. Supp. 2d. 1317, 1333 (Ct.
Int'l. Trade 2002) (discussing the application and binding nature of an adjudication
pursuant to 19 U.S.C. 1581(h) (2003)).
75 See 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a) (2003) (offering the updated Tariff Act incorporating all
amendments from 2003 to the present).
76 See 19 U.S.C. § 1501 (2003) (stating that the Customs Service may reliquidate a
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equally balances the rights of importers and government.
In many ways, however, the government enjoys a distinct
advantage over the importer in its ability to extend its reach
backward and either to withhold action on entries with a view to
a duty increase, or to assess a additional duties without a clear
corresponding right of challenge by the importer. Under § 504 of
the Tariff Act, as amended, the Customs Service can extend the
liquidation of an entry for up to a total of four years if it believes
that it lacks sufficient information to appraise or classify. 77 As a
practical matter, therefore, if the government believes that
additional facts may lead to an increase in duties assessed, it can
extend the liquidation period and thus expand the universe of
entries against which any advancement in rate or value would
apply. The importer has no automatic right to block such an
extension or compel a prompt liquidation.
Second, and more importantly, § 592(d) of the Tariff Act, as
amended, authorizes the Customs Service to collect duties due on
entries which are the subject of a penalty proceeding, even if the
90-day period within which to recall or reliquidate an entry has
lapsed. 78 The statute of limitations in penalty proceedings,
absent a showing of fraud, is five years from the date of entry, 79
effectively granting Customs the right to increase duties for five
years under § 1592(d) on liquidated entries, without affording the
importer the right to challenge the assessment outside of the
penalty framework. A similar grant under § 1593a(d) is vested in
Customs in demanding the return of drawback refunds on
liquidated drawback entries without a right of judicial review. 80
To re-establish equity in duty assessments, Congress should
amend 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a) to extend from 90 days to three (3)
years, the time in which the liquidation of a Customs entry or
drawback claim may be protested. A three-year protest period
would have the following advantages:
liquidation or reliquidation claim within ninety days from the date of notice of
liquidation).
77 See 19 U.S.C. § 1504 (2003) (incorporating amendments from 1984, 1993, 1994 and
1996).
78 See 19 U.S.C. § 1592(d) (2003) (including amendments from 1935, 1978, 1980,
1993, 1996 and 1999).
79 See 19 U.S.C. § 1621 (2003) (explaining that the five year statute of limitations
begins when the alleged offense is discovered).
80 See 19 U.S.C. § 1593a(d) (2003) (requiring duties and taxes to be restored to the
United States).
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. it more closely aligns the importer's right to protest with
the Customs Service's right to withhold liquidation in
contemplation of a possible rate or value advance;
. it more closely aligns the right to challenge Customs' duty
assessments with the right to challenge assessments under
Federal income tax law;
. it parallels the time period established by the United
States' principal trading partners, notably Canada and the
European Union, for importers' challenges to duty
assessments;
. it will not require any changes in Customs current record
keeping retention rules, which, in most cases, require
importers to maintain records of import transactions for at
least five years;S1
. it more closely approximates the current government right
to assess back duties under both the penalty statute and the
drawback penalty statute;
. it will reduce the number of cases in which Customs will
institute or threaten to institute proceedings under 19 U.S.C.
§s 1592 or 1593 for the actual purpose of simply collecting
duties otherwise time-barred by the reliquidation limit set
out in 19 U.S.C. § 1501.
Extending the period for protesting Customs liquidations
would promote equity in the duty assessment system and expand
access to justice for importers wishing to challenge Customs
assessments. It would also limit repetitive paperwork, since
importers would not be required to file as many different
Customs protests or CIT summonses raising identical claims.
Expanded protest and reliquidation periods would not
seriously disadvantage Customs sureties, since under current
practice, sureties are generally liable for withheld duty
assessments made against their principals pursuant to 19 U.S.C.
§ 1592(d), and Customs frequently asks sureties to waive
applicable statutes of limitations regarding such claims.
81 See 19 U.S.C. § 1508 (outlining the record keeping requirement imposed on
importers).
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Granting sureties a three-year period to protest Customs' bond
demands would presumably offset any prejudice to sureties
resulting from a longer reliquidation period.
Since one goal of reform would be to promote equity in the duty
assessment system, it would be appropriate to extend the
government's statutory period to reliquidate an entry under 19
U.S.C. § 1501 from the current 90 days to three years. While at
first blush, this might seem to disadvantage importers, the fact is
that when Customs believes that a retroactive duty assessment
should be made, it frequently proceeds against the importer
under 28 U.S.C. § 1592(d), which is subject to a five year statute
of limitations.
II. AMEND 19 U.S.C. § 1514(A)(3) TO DEFINE AS PROTESTABLE
"EXACTIONS" CUSTOMS' DEMANDS FOR WITHHELD DUTIES OR
OVERCLAIMED DRAWBACK UNDER 19 U.S.C. §S 1592(D) AND
1593A(D); EXTEND THE DEFINITION OF "CHARGE" TO INCLUDE
VOLUNTARY TENDERS OF DUTIES MADE DURING 19 U.S.C. § 1592
AND 1593 INVESTIGATIONS OR PROCEEDINGS

A. Demands for the Payment of "Withheld Duties" under 19
U.S.C. § 1592(d) or Overclaimed Drawback Under 19 U.S.C.
§ 1593
When subsection (d) to 19 U.S.C. § 1592 was added by the
Customs Procedural Reform and Simplification Act of 1978, it
was intended only as the formal mechanism for allowing
Customs to recover duties negligently or intentionally underpaid
by virtue of acts, statements or omissions which violated the
proscription of 19 U.S.C. § 1592(a). It was intended to preclude
importers from raising the 90-day reliquidation period of 19
U.S.C. § 1501 as a defense to duty assessments in such actions. §
1592 (d) was clearly intended to be an ancillary remedy in a
larger penalty proceeding.
In recent years, however, the Customs Service has increasingly
converted this ancillary remedy to a primary one. Customs
import specialists, auditors and agents routinely raise the
spectra of a 19 U.S.C. § 1592 proceeding in order to exact from
importers additional duties relating to entries which have long
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been liquidated and final. 82 Faced with the possibility of penalty
assessments equal to a multiple of the duties in question (not to
mention the legal and personal costs associated with defending
themselves against penalty claims), importers frequently
capitulate and "voluntarily" pay the otherwise time-barred
duties. Consequently, Customs uses 19 U.S.C. § 1592(d), an
enforcement statute, both as a means for redress and a method of
collecting duties not otherwise collectable. An importer faced
with the choice of paying, for example, $100,000 in questionable
duties on long-liquidated entries, or facing multi-million dollar
penalty proceedings, will almost always pay the duties, simply as
a business decision. In many cases, the cost of defending even an
ill-founded penalty claim is likely to approach or exceed the duty
amount demanded. Moreover, the businessperson avoids the
need to explain a large government penalty assessment to
shareholders, lenders and regulators.
In this way, 19 U.S.C. § 1592(d) is often used to exact (some
might say extort) questionable duties from importers, often in
cases where the only issues presented are routine questions of
tariff classification, appraisement or rules of origin-issues
which ordinarily would (could and should) be resolved by the CIT
in 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) "protest" actions. The current system not
only blocks importers' access to justice, but prevents the CIT
from creating a body of substantive legal precedent for the
guidance of importers and Customs officers in future cases.
Amending 19 U.S.C. § 1514(a) to provide for the filing of a
protest against demands for payments under 19 U.S.C. §§
1592(d) and 1593(d) would eliminate such potential Federal
overreaching, ensure that these contested issues can be judicially
reviewed, and restore equity to the Customs administration
process.

82 In some cases, Customs does not even make explicit reference to 19 U.S.C. § 1592,
but demands duties from importers based upon the simple assertion that Customs has the
right to proceed retroactively for a five-year period. See United States v. Almany, 22 Ct.
Int'l Trade 490, 497 (noting that the government has five years in which to initiate a case
under 1592). Indeed, it has been the authors' experience that Customs auditors routinely
propose five-year retroactive assessments of duty against importers blissfully unaware
that, as a technical matter, the initiation of a 19 U.S.C. § 1592 claim, and a finding that
19 U.S.C. § 1592(a) has been violated, are statutory prerequisites to such assessments.
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B. Demands for "Voluntary"Payments
In many cases, Customs does not even need to proceed to a
formal demand for duties under 19 U.S.C. §s 1592 or 1593; the
threat of such assessments, usually combined with the
threatened assessment of a penalty, causes many importers or
drawback claimants to "voluntarily" tender amounts demanded
by Customs during the course of Customs audits, or during
routine dealings with the Customs Service. As noted above, there
is no clear mechanism whereby importers can seek recovery of
these sums, unless they can prove that the sums were
involuntarily "exacted."8 3 The involuntary nature of a payment is
likely to be difficult to prove, especially when the payment is
made before formal proceedings for the assessment of withheld
duties or overpaid drawback are even commenced.
As a substantive matter, however, the payment of duties
pursuant to a formal demand is no different than the payment of
duties under threat of such a demand. Both types of payment
should engender a right of judicial review.
One way to avoid an inequity is to amend § 514 the Tariff Act
to identify the payment of duties after the period for
reliquidation of an entry or claim as a protestable "charge." This
would ensure that importers making such payments are
guaranteed a right to judicial review of legal issues raised by
Customs (which often are raised years after import entries are
liquidated and made final, usually in the course of postliquidation Customs audits). Customs should embrace such a
change to the Tariff Act, since it would provide importers with an
additional incentive to self-disclose potential legal violations in
cases where the law is less than settled, and provide importers
with additional incentives to cooperate fully in Customs
investigations. It would also allow for a proper focus on the
merits of particular claims or transactions, rather than the
gamesmanship and maneuvering which are currently major
focuses of post-liquidation duty claim scenarios.
C. Amend the CIT's Governing Statutes and Rules to Streamline
83 Under current law, duties voluntarily tendered even if to avoid or mitigate
penalties are not considered "charges" and are not protestable. See Carlingswitch Inc. v.
United States, 68 C.C.P.A. 49, 55 (1980).
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"Protest"Litigation under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a)

As discussed above, one result of the current short statute of
limitations for filing protests is importers must file repetitive
protests against identical Customs decisions, and, upon denials
of those protests, file multiple CIT actions under 28 U.S.C. §
1581(a) in order to completely litigate a single issue.8 4 As a
result, the CIT devotes an inordinate amount of effort to helping
the parties to a lawsuit define the scope of their dispute. The
multiplicity of actions involving common questions of law or fact
thrusts upon litigants certain procedural choices, which are
unique to the CIT concerning how their cases should be litigated
- under the CIT's unique "Test case/suspension" procedure,8 5
under "consolidation" procedures, 8 6 or as "standalone" litigation.
Moreover, the litigant must justify to the Court its choice of
procedures.8 7 As a result, extensive docketing and case-tracking
requirements, and motion practice in 28 U.S.C. § 1581(a) cases
burden the Court.
The requirement that separate protests and lawsuits be filed
for every single Customs entry affected by an issue, even after
the importer has made clear its intent to litigate the issue,
creates additional work for Customs, the business community,
and ultimately, the CIT. This may include, for example, motions
to dismiss actions in whole or in part based upon failure to file
protests or summonses timely. While it might be argued that
these formalities are required as a condition of the government's
waiver of sovereign immunity in Customs cases, the formalities
are arcane, and do not appear to confer a significant benefit on
anyone. They have produced a cumbersome process of action on
protests by rote, multiple court cases covering identical issues;
suspension and suspension disposition calendars; stipulations,
decisions and judgments and motions related to calendar
maintenance. In effect, the Court is as much managing entries
84 This is especially true when merchandise subject to a common legal issue is
entered at different United States ports of entry. See Florex v. United States, 13 Ct. Int'l
Trade 28, 38 (discussing competition between products and ports of entry). Liquidation
and protest decisions typically move at different velocities through the Customs
apparatus at different ports of entry.
85 See USCIT R.84-1(b) (defining the "test case").
86 See USCIT R.42 (discussing the options for consolidations of separate actions).
87 See, e.g., Totes, Inc. v. United States, 16 Ct. Int'l Trade 706, 708 (1992) (upholding
choice of "test case" procedure instead of consolidation).
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as it is managing issues and deciding cases. The time has come
to consider streamlined procedures for filing Customs cases in
the CIT.
There are several ways to address this problem and streamline
the process. One way would be to amend § 504 of the Tariff Act
of 1930 to give the importer the right to demand the automatic
suspension of the entry liquidation period for an indefinite time
by certifying to Customs that proper liquidation of an entry
requires a resolution of an issue then before the CIT.88
Liquidation of the entry would remain suspended until a
specified time after the issue before the Court is finally decided.
Under this procedure, the CIT could devote its energies to
resolving substantive issues of legal interpretation, with a
minimum of "housekeeping."
Every Customs case would
effectively become a "test case." Once a substantive legal issue
has been resolved, the Court's involvement with other entries
affected by the decision would be nonexistent, or would be a
limitation to resolving disputes about whether the Court's
decision actually resolves issues affecting the "certified" entries
in question.
Another way to handle this matter would be to eliminate the
requirement that separate protests and summonses be filed with
respect to each entry affected by an issue in litigation before the
Court. For instance, once an importer files a timely summons
involving merchandise affected by a given legal issue, it could
then notify the Court in writing of additional liquidated entries
affected by the issue being litigated. The Court could then create
an "association file" of such entries, whose liquidation would be
deemed not to be final until the judicial resolution of the issue is
finalized. It is likely that an "association file" procedure would
be limited to entries made by the litigant in the CIT action, while
an "automatic suspension" provision could more readily be
exercised by parties other than the plaintiff.
Procedures for bringing Customs actions before the CIT have
changed little in the past century.
Given increased trade
volumes, and an explosion in the growth of consumption entry
filing, it is now appropriate for bench and bar to consider
88 See 19 U.S.C. § 1504 (stating that the merchandise will be liquidated within one
year from several possible events).
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methods for streamlining the process of bring Customs actions
before the CIT in an efficient way which allows litigants to
protect their legal rights, while allowing the Court to shed some
of the clerical "housekeeping" chores which now consume much of
its attention.8 9
Regardless of how the streamlining is achieved, it is now
appropriate for bench and bar to consider ways to improve the
efficiency of the CIT's operations in Customs cases, and to help
free the Court's resources to enable it to concentrate its efforts on
substantive Customs issues.
III. CIT JURISDICTION OVER CUSTOMS SEIZURES
Recently, the Court of International Trade appointed an
Advisory Committee on Jurisdiction, which was tasked with
considering possible additions to the Court's national jurisdiction
over Customs and Trade matters. The Advisory Committee's
Report suggested that the CIT seek expanded jurisdiction over
certain types of cases, 9 0 while suggesting that other types of
89 In the ongoing legal challenges to the Harbor Maintenance Tax (HMT) on exports,
28 U.S.C. § 2644, many exporters filed actions under 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i), seeking recovery
of export HMTs paid within two years prior to the commencement of the action [the
statute of limitations applicable to such cases]. See Swisher Int'l, Inc. v. United States,
178 F. Supp. 2d 1354, 1358 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2001) (finding one clause of the HMT
unconstitutional). In most cases, the relief granted in these cases was both backward- and
forward-looking, encompassing tax payments made within the two years prior to the filing
of the suit, plus tax payments made after the filing of the suit.
90 See Report of the United States Court of InternationalTrade Advisory Committee on
Jurisdiction [hereinafter "Advisory Committee Report"]. Among the areas where the
Advisory Committee Report suggested the assignment of subject matter jurisdiction to the
CIT were:
- Seizures of merchandise by the United States Customs Service under the Tariff
Act of 1930 or another provision of law codified in Title 19 of the United States
Code, the Trading With the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. App. § 1 et seq. (1917), and the
Espionage Act, 22 U.S.C § 401 (1917);
- Cases involving Customs' seizure of goods for violation of intellectual property
rights;
Judicial enforcement of Customs Service summonses issued pursuant to 19 U.S.C.

§ 1510;
- Importer-initiated actions seeking judicial review of penalty determinations, see
Trayco, Inc. v. United States, 994 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Commodities Export
Co. v. United States Customs Service, 888 F.2d 431 (6" Cir. 1989);
- Expanded jurisdiction over challenges to Customs rulings;
State law violations of United States obligations under the World Trade
Organization (WTO) agreements [19 U.S.C. § 3512(b)(2) (1994)];
- Actions by importers against licensed
Customhouse brokers for alleged
malpractice;
- Lawsuits by sureties against importers under Customs bonds;
- Export control and antiboycott cases (although the a Advisory Committee report
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trade-related cases were not appropriately included in the
Court's jurisdictional grant. 91
The topic of Customs seizures that might be brought under the
CIT's jurisdiction bears additional discussion. At present, the
CIT's jurisdiction over goods, which become the subject of
Customs seizures, is utterly dependent on the status of particular
merchandise at the time the Court's jurisdiction is invoked. If
goods are excluded from United States commerce, a protest may
be filed against such exclusions (including a demand for
redelivery). However, once Customs has seized the goods, the
CIT lacks the ability to review the seizure, which then rests with
the Federal District Courts in the district where the seizure took
place. 92 The dichotomy lacks sense, however, since the
substantive issues are likely to be similar or identical whether
Customs acts against the goods by means of exclusion or seizure.
One sensible way to resolve the matter is to give the CIT
exclusive jurisdiction over actions to condemn and forfeit seized
merchandise entered under cover of formal or informal
consumption entries. 93 The CIT has expertise in issues involving
the importation and regulation of commercial goods. Other types
of seizures are also appropriate candidates for exclusive CIT
jurisdiction.
A. Specific Recommendations for CIT Jurisdictionover Seizures
and Enforcement Matters
This article sets out a comparison of provisions under Federal
law allowing for the seizure of commercial goods and currency for
noted that such cases were rare);
- Foreign Corrupt Practice Act (FCPA) cases.
91 See Advisory Committee Report.
Among the actions which the Advisory
Committee deemed unsuitable for the CIT were: private rights of action under the
Antidumping Act of 1916; cases arising under the Carriage of Goods by Seal Act; cases
arising under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act; Federal Maritime Cases; and
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). See id.
92 See, e.g., International Maven Inc. v. McCauley, 12 Ct. Int'l Trade 55 (1988)
(holding the CIT lacks jurisdiction where goods have been seized before exclusion is
protested); Milin Industries, Inc. v. United States, 12 Ct. Int'l Trade 658 (1988) (finding
the CIT has jurisdiction over exclusion protest filed before goods were seized).
93 Due process considerations may require that jurisdiction over noncommercial
seizures (i.e., seizure of undeclared controlled substances, seizures of conveyances
carrying controlled substances) remain with the local Federal District Courts in the
district where the noncommercial seizures took place. See CDCOM (USA) Int'l v. United
States, 21 Ct. Int'l Trade 435, 438 (1997) (discussing jurisdictional issues with regards to
the location of the seizure).
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violation of law. A substantial number of these laws deal with
the seizure of goods moving in international trade. There are
ample reasons to confer on the CIT jurisdiction over actions
dealing with seizures under the import and export laws.
1. Export Related Laws
As noted above, the CIT has jurisdiction over seized goods only
to the extent that Customs' exclusion of merchandise has been
protested before the seizure has been affected. All other export
related issues are handled by the U.S. District Court. This
jurisdiction extends only to imports, although Federal law
provides a variety of statutes that justify the seizure of exported
goods for various legal violations.
If the Court of International Trade is to live up to its mandate
of resolving trade issues, there is no reason why its jurisdiction
should not include responsibility of the full array of export as
well as import matters. Similarly, in an increasingly electronic
world, there is no reason why the Court should not deal in some
electronic-based trade as well as goods-based trade. Toward that
end, serious consideration should be given to vesting the CIT
with subject matter jurisdiction over the following classes of
export-related matters:
The denial of export licenses by any agency of government,
challenges to the export classification of an article, or the
delay in or refusal to act on a license application;
The denial of export privileges for persons (including
juridical persons) subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States;
All civil fines, penalties or forfeitures arising for violation of
the laws governing bulk cash export of currency or the
failure to declare currency at the time of exportation within
title 31 of the U.S. Code;
All civil fines, penalties and forfeitures from violations of the
Export Administration Act, the Trading with the Enemy Act,
the International Trafficking in Arms Act, the Espionage Act
and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act and
any of the regulations implementing any of these laws.
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Civil fines, penalties or forfeitures arising under laws
limiting trade with countries supporting international
terrorism.
2. Import Related Laws
Section 592 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended, is the
enforcement statute most frequently invoked against commercial
importers, 94 but there are numerous other import statutes over
which Federal District Courts continue to exercise exclusive
jurisdiction. However, the subject matter which these statutes
deal with suggest that their enforcement and administration
could benefit from the use of the specialized expertise of the CIT.
Consideration should be given to conferring exclusive jurisdiction
on the CIT of matters arising under the following import-related
laws:
All civil fines, penalties and forfeitures, including seizures,
arising under any alleged violation of any import provision
within title 19 of the U.S. Code, other than those related to
narcotics offenses; and
All civil fines, penalties or forfeitures arising for violation of
the laws governing bulk cash smuggling, or false declaration
at entry, or failure to declare at entry currency within 19
U.S.C. Title 31.
3. Electronic international movement of funds
Logic also suggests that consideration be given to vesting the
CIT with exclusive jurisdiction over various emerging areas of
electronic commerce, including all civil fines, penalties and
forfeitures arising for violation of laws governing the
international wire transfer of funds within title 31 of the U.S.
Code.
These suggestions should be taken as a starting point for a
discussion by bench, bar and legislature of ways to effectively
extend the jurisdiction of the CIT to enable it to fulfill its mission
as the exclusive arbiter of United States customs and trade laws.
94 See 19 U.S.C. § 1592 (2003) (putting forth penalties for fraud, negligence, and gross
negligence).
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IV. CONCLUSION
In the generation since the Customs Courts Act of 1980 entered
into force, there have been few changes to the statutes governing
judicial review of Customs decisions. During that time, however,
Customs administrative practices have undergone substantial, if
not revolutionary change. The CIT's governing statutes no longer
adequately address many of the procedural scenarios under
which Customs law disputes arise. This fact, combined with the
decline in United States tariff rates, has resulted in a reduction
of Customs litigation in the CIT.
Constitutional considerations of due process require that each
taxpayer be given the opportunity to challenge tax and duty
assessments before an impartial decision maker. 95 This right is
not defined or circumscribed by the size of the assessment. In
Customs duty cases, the CIT is that impartial decision maker.
The Court's procedures should reflect the nature of the cases it is
charged with deciding, while ensuring the broadest possible
access to judicial review of Customs decisions.
In addition, it is clear that the CIT's jurisdictional mandate
only covers a small portion of the enforcement actions that can
potentially arise under the Customs, trade and related laws.
This caution probably reflects the fact that, prior to the Customs
Courts Act of 1980, the CIT's predecessor only had jurisdiction of
actions commenced by importers and others against the
government, and not actions brought by the government to
enforce the laws. Two decades of CIT experience with civil
Customs penalty actions under 19 U.S.C. § 1592 has
demonstrated that the CIT is an appropriate and capable forum
for handling such enforcement matters.
Bringing about the changes needed to truly "modernize"
Customs litigation will likely require some combination of
legislative action and amendments to the CIT's rules and
procedures. As noted above, there are several alternative ways
in which broader and more equitable review of Customs decisions
can be sought. But a generation has passed since the CIT's
governing statute was enacted, and the time has come for the
95 See, e.g., Nickey v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 393, 396 (1934) ("[iut is enough that all
available defenses may be presented to a competent tribunal before exaction of the tax
and before the command of the state to pay it becomes final and irrevocable").
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bench, bar and international trading community to undertake a
concerted effort to outline the future of Customs litigation in the
United States Court of International Trade.
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APPENDIX
PART I
ENFORCEMENT STATUTES MOST
FREQUENTLY INVOKED FOR VIOLATION
OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAWS
Citation

Description

Elements of the Statute

Punishment, Fine,
Penalty

18 USC §542

Entry of goods
by means of
false statements.

Two years imprisonment
plus unspecified fine;
Criminal resolution does
not relieve importer from
forfeiture.

18 USC §545

Smuggling.

Prohibits entry or attempted entry of merchandise by means of false
statement made without
reasonable cause to believe
its truth, whether or not
the U.S. is or may be deprived of duties;
Prohibits willful act or
omission by which the U.S.
is or may be deprived of duties.
Prohibits the smuggling or
clandestine entry of merchandise into the U.S.,
knowingly, willfully and
with intent to defraud;
Prohibits introduction of
merchandise which should
have been invoiced; prohibits attempts to pass false or
fraudulent invoices or documents; or
Prohibits fraudulent or
knowing importation into
the U.S. contrary to law.
Prohibits the concealment
of more than $10,000 in any
conveyance, luggage, merchandise or container, with
intent to avoid currency reporting requirement of 31
USC §5316;

Section 371,
Bulk cash
USA Patriot
smuggling,
Act of 2001, 31
USC §5332

Five years imprisonment,
unspecified fine, forfeiture of smuggled product.

Five years imprisonment;
Forfeiture of currency;
Personal money judgement if restitution unavaifare;
vailable;
Civil forfeiture;
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Prohibits transfer or transport from a place within
U.S. to a place outside U.S.
or from a place outside U.S.
to a place inside U.S.

t

18 USC §2318

Trafficking in
counterfeit
labels for
phonorecords,
computer programs, motion
pictures and
audio visual
works.

50 USC §2410 Violations of
the U.S. Export Control
Regulations.

Seizure of container or
conveyances used to conceal or facilitate the concealment.

Requires persons transport- Willful violation of 31
ing in excess of $10,000 at USC §5316 punishable
one time to report such im- by 5 years imprisonment
ports or exports at the time plus $250,000 fine (31
USC §5322);
of entry or exit.
Willful violation of §5316
while violating another
law as part of a pattern
of illegal activity
$500,000 plus 10 years;
Civil penalties of forfeiture, to be reduced by the
amount of criminal fine.
If report not filed, civil
penalty equal to money
traceable to the instrument and penalty equal
to the amount of money
traceable to the instrument. 31 USC §5317 and
5321.

Reports on
exporting or
importing of
monetary instruments.

31 USC §5316

113

1

Prohibits trafficking in
such products which requires a showing that:
Offense was committed
within the maritime or aircraft jurisdiction of the
U.S.;
mail or interstate facility
was used;
counterfeit article was affixed to or enclosed in copyright material; in the case
of documentation for computers, that original documentation was copyrighted.

r
Unspecified fines; plus
imprisonment of five
years, or both.
Forfeiture or destruction
of counterfeit labels.

Prohibits:
(a) Knowing violations or
conspiracies or attempts to
knowingly violate the provisions of the Export Administration Act (EAA);

(a) Five years imprisonment plus the greater of
five times the value of
the export, or $50,000.
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(b)(1) Willful violations or
attempts to violate EAA;
(2) Willful failure of licensee to report misuse of export technology to a controlled country;
(3) Possession with intent
to export in violation of
EAA;
(4) Actions taken with intent to evade provisions of
EAA or of licenses issued
pursuant to EAA.

22 USC §2780

[Arms Export]
Transactions
with countries
supporting
international
terrorism -

prohibited
acts.

19 USC §1304 Marking of
imported articles to indicate foreign
origin.

(a) Certain actions prohibited by U.S. Government;
(b) Prohibited transactions
by U.S. Persons.
1. Exporting munitions to
any specifically designated
country;
2. Selling, leasing, loaning,
granting or otherwise providing munitions to a country or to a person acting on
behalf of such government;
3. Extends liability to foreign subsidiaries of U.S.
corporations;
4. Extends to actions taken
outside of the U.S. by U.S.
persons.
Every article of foreign origin must be marked conspicuously legibly, indelibly
and permanently to indicate to the ultimate purchaser in the United States
the foreign country of origin
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(b)(1) Corporation. The
greater of five times the
value of the export or
$1,000,000.
(b)(1) Individual.
$250,000 plus 10 years
imprisonment.
(b)(2) Corporation. (Same
as (b)(1).)
(b)(2) Individual.
$250,000 plus 5 years.
(b)(3) varies depending
upon the nature of the
control.
(b)(4) varies depending
upon the nature of the
control

(b) Criminal:
$1,000,000 or ten years
imprisonment, or both.
Civil:
Penalties as provided
under the Export Administration Act [50
U.S.C. §2410] but not to
exceed $500,000 per offense.

Civil: 10% additional
duty,
Criminal (requires proof
of intent to conceal information):First offense:
$100,000 or one year;
Second or subsequent:
$250,000 or one year.

19 USC §1307 Convict-made Prohibits entry of goods
_goods,

impor- manufactured by convict,

Seizure of goods. No
other fine or penalty
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tation prohib- forced orunder indentured
ited.
labor.
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specified.

Civil: $5,000 for first violation; $10,000 for second
and subsequent violation;
Criminal: Requires proof
of intentional failure.
$2,000 plus 1 year; importation of prohibited
merchandise carries additional fine of $10,000 or
five years.
19 USC § 1453 Lading and
Prohibits the unlading of
Penalty equal to the
unlading
imported merchandise from value of merchandise ilgoods without any vessel, vehicle or air- legally unladen, plus fora permit.
craft without permission.
feiture of vessel or vehicle if the value of the
goods unladen exceeds
19 USC §1436

Penalties for
violations of
arrival, reporting, entry,
and clearance
requirements.

Prohibits entry of vessels
without production of manifest; requires notice of arrival and permission to depart and discharge;
requires vessels to make
entry within 24 hrs. of arrival.

$500.
19 USC §1454 Unlading of Prohibits the unlading of
passengers
arriving passengers withwithout a per- out permit.
mit.
19 USC §1455 Customs inspectors
boarding or

Prohibits officer, master,
crew or agent from interfering with Customs inspector.

Penalty equal to $1000
for the first passenger
unladen, plus $500 for
each passenger thereafter.
$500 fine.

discharging.

19 USC §1459 Reporting ar- Requires arriving passenrivals; indigers to report arrival to the
viduals.
U.S. promptly and to present ID upon arrival,

Civil: Failure to report or
present valid ID. First
offense: $5,000. Second
and Subsequent: $10,000.
Criminal: Intentional
failure to report; presentation of false, altered or
fraudulent document;
$5,000 plus one year imprisonment.

19 USC §1462 Requirement
to submit to
baggage examination
upon demand.

19 USC §1464 Penalties in
connection
with sealed

Requires person who is requested, to comply with
demand for inspection by
presenting baggage.

Civil: If prohibited merchandise is found, authorizes the seizure and
forfeiture of the prohibited goods plus contents
of the container plus vehicle.
Prohibits failure to proceed Criminal: $1000 fine plus
promptly to the port of des- five years imprisoament.
tination; unlading of mer-
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vessels and
vehicles,
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chandise other than at the
port of destination; illegal
disposal of merchandise by
the vessel master.

19 USC §1497 Failure to de- Article is not declared if: is
not included in the declaraclare,
tion, and is not mentioned
before examination of the
baggage begins, either in
writing or orally.

19 USC §1509 Recordkeeping - failure to
maintain and
produce records.

Requires importers and
others to keep, maintain
and produce upon demand
records related to the importation of merchandise.

19 USC §1526 Importation of
merchandise
bearing
American
trademark,

Prohibits importation of
merchandise, or its packaging, bearing trademark
owned by U.S. person and
registered with U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office;
Prohibits importation of
goods bearing counterfeit
marks;
Prohibits aiding and abetting; financial or other
assistance

Civil:
Goods not declared are
subject to forfeiture;
If the article is a controlled substance, $500 o
ten times the value of the
substance, whichever is
the greater;
If the article is not a controlled substance, then
the value of the article
not declared.
Willful failure to produce
documents demanded,
$100,000 per entry or
75% of value of the merchandise, whichever is
less;
Negligent failure to produce documents demanded, a penalty equal
to $10,000 per entry, or
40% of value, whichever
is less; plus, right to advance rate of duty; denial
of preferences. Certain
concessions for existing
recordkeeping compliance program; penalties
not exclusive.
Civil remedies:
For infringing
goods:Seizure and forfeiture, injunction and damages.
For counterfeit goods:
a
S
Seizure and forfeiture;
For aiders and abettors:
First offense:
Penalty equal value of
bona fide merchandise;
Second offense:
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Penalty equal to twice
the value of bona fide
merchandise.

19 USC §1584 Penalties for
false manifests.

-4

19 USC §1586 Unlawful
unlading and
transshipment of merchandise.

19 USC § 1590 lAviation
smuggling.

Requires vessel master to
produce manifest to Customs upon demand; requires that goods unladen
match manifest; imposes
penalties for entry and
unlading unmanifested
merchandise.

-I.

(a) Prohibits unlading of
merchandise from hovering
vessel or from a vessel in
foreign commerce without
permission to unlade;
(b) Prohibits unlading of
prohibited merchandise including wines and spirits
from a vessel in foreign
commerce or from a hovering vessel for purposes of
unlawful entry;
(c) Prohibits transshipments of prohibited merchandise from foreign or
hovering vessel to U.S. vessel of prohibited merchandise;
(d) Liability for master of
the receiving vessel;
(e) Liability for aiders and
abettors of transshipment;
(f) Special exception for
unlading because of accident or distress.
(a) Prohibits pilot or other
Iperson on board an aircraft

Failure to produce manifest upon demand:
$1,000.
Unlading of unmanifested merchandise:
lesser of $10,000 or the
value of the unmanifested merchandise;
Penalty for manifested
but not found merchandise: $1,000.
Exceptions for nonnegligent loss of manifest
or clerical errors;
Special rules for unmanifested narcotics and
wines and spirits.
4

Penalty: Twice the value
of the merchandise, but
not less than $10,000.
Plus forfeiture of vessel.
(b) same as (a)

(c) same as (a)

(d) same as (a)
(e) 15 years imprisonment
(f) no penalty.

Penalties:
Civil: twice the value of
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to possess or to transport
merchandise knowing it
will be introduced contrary
to law;
(b) Prohibits transfer of
merchandise between vessel and aircraft without
permission;

19 USC §1592 1
Penalties for

fraud, gross
negligence
and negligence.

-I

+
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the merchandise, but not
less than $10,000; Criminal:
If unlawfully entered
merchandise is not a controlled substance:
$10,000 plus five years;
If unlawfully entered
merchandise is a controlled substance:
$250,000 plus 20 years;
Seizure and forfeiture of
aircraft, if other than
common carrier.

Prohibits:
Penalties: Negligent
(a) Entry or attempted en- presentation or preparatry of merchandise into the tion of documents: Twice
revenue lost or, if no
U.S. by means of false
statements on documents revenue lost, then 20% of
or electronically transmit- the value of the merted data; prohibits material chandise;
Gross negligence: Four
omissions;
Exceptions for clerical er- times revenue lost or, if
no revenue lost, then
rors, including errors re40% of value of the merpeated in electronic syschandise;
tems, if not a pattern of
Fraud: Penalty equal to
negligent conduct;
value
of the merchandise.
Authorizes reduced penalties for prior disclosure of Prior disclosure: (discloviolations with special rules sure made before or without the knowledge of the
for prior disclosure of
commencement of the
NAFTA misstatements.
investigation):
Of negligence and gross
negligence: interest on
duties underpaid.
Of fraud: penalty equal
to the duties underpaid.
Government has right to
restoration of lost duties;
No liability for importer
who makes false NAFTA
claim based on information given to importer
from Certificate of Origin. Statute applies to
exports of goods falsely
certified as NAFTA
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eligble.
19 USC §1592a Special Penalty Provisions for Textile Violations.

(a) Authorizes, but does not (a) Places affirmative obligation on an importer
require, the Secretary of
Treasury to publish list of from such entities to esforeign entities cited under tablish that accompanysection 1592 for providing ing documentation of fufalse documents related to ture shipments are valid.
textile shipments and their
country of origin;
(b) Authorizes, but does not
require, President to publish a list of countries failing to cooperate with U.S.
in ceasing violations of (a)
above;

4

19USC §1593a Penalties for
false drawback claims.

4

Prohibits:
(a) seeking payment or
credit to any person of any
drawback claim by means
of false statements on
documents or electronically
transmitted data; or material omissions.
Exceptions for clerical errors, including errors repeated in electronic systems, if not a pattern of
negligent conduct.
Authorizes reduced penalties for prior disclosure of
violations;
Requires approval of Customs Headquarters to allege fraud.

19 USC §1595a Forfeitures
and other
penalties.

(a) Permits but does not
require the seizure of vessels, vehicles and aircraft
etc. used in the illegal importation of merchandise;
(b) Treats persons directing, assisting or in any way
concerned with the unlawful importation as one liable to a penalty equal to
the value of the merchandise illegally entered;

(b) Places affirmative obligation on an importer ol
goods from such country
to demonstrate exercise
of reasonable care in ascertaining the true country of origin of the textiles in question.

4

Penalty:
Fraud:
Three times revenue
lost;Negligence - First

offense 20% of revenue
lost;Second offense: 50%
of revenue lost;Third and
subsequent offense: 100%
of revenue lost.
Prior disclosure: Fraud 100% of lost revenue;
Negligence - interest of

funds refunded.
(d) Government has right
to restoration of proceeds.Special rules for
compliant record keepers.
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(c) Requires the seizure of:
stolen, smuggled or clandestinely entered merchandise;
controlled substances imported in violation of law;
contraband;
explosives.
Permits but does not require the seizure of:
merchandise subject to restriction;
merchandise entered without required license or permit;
merchandise entered in violation of trademarks;
merchandise containing
trade dress in violation of
court order;
merchandise intentionally
mis-marked to indicate
country of origin, or for
which importer has committed previous marking
violations;
Prohibits the seizure of:
merchandise subject to allegations of violations of
law for classification and
valuation purposes only.

19 USC §1617 Compromise
of claims by
the Secretary
of Treasury.

Authorizes the Secretary of
Treasury to compromise
claims arising under the
Customs laws, following the
issuance of a report by Customs or the U.S. Attorney
19 USC §1618 Remission or Authorizes the person
mitigation of charged with violation of
penalties.
the Customs laws to file
with the Secretary of
Treasury, Commissioner of
Customs or the Commandant of the Coast Guard,
depending upon the nature
of the offense, a petition for
relief from forfeiture. Au-
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thorizes such person to remit or mitigate such a pen19 USC §1619 Award of com- Authorizes payment of repensation to ward for an informer, who
informers,
is not an employee of the
U.S., equal to 25% of net
amount of fine, penalty or
forfeiture collected, not to
exceed $250,000; or 25% of
appraised value of merchandise seized but not
sold.
19 USC §1621 Statute of
limitations,

(a) Causes of action under
the Customs laws must be
commenced within five
years from the date of discovery of the offense, except
if an action is commenced
either under section 1592
and 1593a alleging negligence or gross negligence,
must be commenced within
five years from the date of
the violation;(b) Absence
from the U.S. tolls the statute.

PART II
FORFEITURE AND NARCOTICS OFFENSES
Citation

Description

21 USC §§853; Criminal
870
Forfeiture

Elements of the Statute Penalty
Requires that any person
1. Property constituting
convicted of a violation of or derived from any of the
Subchapters I or II of Chap- proceeds the person obter 13, Title 21 shall forfeit tained directly or indithe following property to
rectly as a result of such
the United States
violation;
2. Any of the person's
property used, or intended to be used, in any
manner or part, to commit or facilitate the commission of such violation;
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Mitigation

§853(I)

21 USC
§853(p)

Substituted
property

21 USC §881

Forfeitures
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3. In the case of a person
convicted of engaging in a
continuing criminal enterprise in violation of
§848 of title 21, the person shall forfeit, in addition to property described
in paragraph 1 and 2,
above, any of his interest
in, claims against, and
property or contractual
rights or a source of control over the continuing
criminal enterprise.
The Attorney General shall (1) Grant petitions for
have the right with respect mitigation or remission of
to property ordered forforfeiture.
feited under this section, to
If property subject to forfei- The court shall order forture, by reason of any act of feiture of other property
the defendant,
of the defendant up to the
of the property
value
1. Cannot be located;
identified in paragraphs
2. Has sold, transferred or 1-5
deposited with a third
party;
3. Has been placed beyond
the jurisdiction of the
Court;
4. Has been substantially
diminished in value;
5. Has been commingled
with property that cannot
be divided without difficulty
The following are subject to 1. All controlled subforfeiture and no property stances which have been
right shall exist in them
manufactured, distributed, dispensed or acquired in violation of this
subchapter;
2. Raw materials used in
the production of controlled substances;
3. Property used as a
container for such substances;
4. Conveyances, includling aircraft, vessels and
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vehicles to transport or
facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of
such property;
. Common carriers excluded unless the owner
was a consenting party to
the violation;
B. No conveyance shall
be forfeited if the violation was performed by
any person other than
the owner, when the conveyance was unlawfully
in the possession of the
person other than the
owner in violation of
criminal law;
C. No forfeiture to the
extent of an interest of an
owner by reason of any
act or omission established by that owner to
have been committed
without knowledge or
consent of the owner.
5. Books records, formula, data, microfilm,
etc. to be used in violation of the subchapter;
6. Money, negotiable instruments, securities, intended to be used in exchange for the controlled
substances;
7. All real property used
to commit or facilitate a
violation of the subchapter;
8. All controlled substances possessed in violation of the subchapter;
9. All chemicals, drug
manufacturing equipment, tableting machines
encapsulating machines,
used to dispense or dis-tribute drugs in violation
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of subchapter I or II of
Chapter 13, Title 21.
10. All drug paraphernalia;
11. Any concealed firearm.

